

Principles of Psychology v1 - Chapter 1: The Scope of Psychology & Chapter 2: The Functions of the Brain

Citation:

James, W. (1890). *The principles of psychology*, Vol. 1. Henry Holt and Co.

- The author attests that Spencerian belief is that mental life and body life are one.
- The author asserts that linguistic use of hearing is in the left-center of the temporal lobe; word association.
- The author affirms that at the turn of the century (20th), we must look to human pathology to perpetuate our understanding of brain function.
- The author asserts that instincts and emotion are reactions to perception.
- The author avows consciousness *preference* must occur everywhere from some sensations from others, and the *end* desire occurs of motor discharges that lead to end desires and develop an association between the sensation and motor skill; this is the development of Will.

Principles of Psychology v1 - Chapter 3: On Some General Conditions of Brain-Activity

Citation:

James, W. (1890). *The principles of psychology*, Vol. 1. Henry Holt and Co.

- The author affirms that simple reaction-time is when the outcome(s) are predetermined due to one possible signal and one possible movement.
- The author attests that perception and apperception are equivalent to *inattentive awareness* of an object and *attention* to an object.
- The author asserts that reaction-time varies with the individual and age; older participants have an approximately one-second delay, and children have a half-a-second delay.
- The author avows that practice for the older participants can reduce delay to .1866 sec, while fatigue lengthens it (reaction-time), and concentration of attention shortens it (reaction-time); the nature of the signal varies.

Principles of Psychology v1 - Chapter 4: Habit

Citation:

James, W. (1890). *The principles of psychology*, Vol. 1. Henry Holt and Co.

- The author affirms that the first proposition is that habit in living beings is due to the plasticity of the organic materials of which their bodies are composed, whereas plasticity is the possession of a framework that gives influence but resists the full indoctrination.
- The author asserts that the habit is the result of growth by exercise or practice.
- The author attests that the first benefit of habit is when it simplifies the movements required to achieve a given result, increasing accuracy and decrease fatigue; it decreases the conscious attention with which our actions are performed.
- The author avows that when learning to complete activities (i.e., walk, run, or swim), we have interruptions (times to learn sequences); however, once we reach proficiency, we have minimal transitioned from muscular action to a single instantaneous 'cue.'
- The author maintains that no community appreciates habit like a second nature action as that of the veteran.
- The author believes that we create habits that need to change; moral habits are the ability to launch ourselves with as strong and decided an initiative as possible and never suffer an expectation to occur till the new habit is securely rooted in your life.
- The author affirms that moral habits are obtained when repetition fortified the action to a point when the action can be completed, the optimal best pathway for mental progress.
- The author asserts that moral habits' third benefit is to seize the very first possible opportunity to act on every resolution you make and on every emotional prompting you may experience in the direction of habits you aspire to gain.
- The author that the physical facts go along by themselves, and the mental facts go along by themselves; parallelism exists between them, but there is no disruption of one with the other; mind history and body history runs alongside one another responding, but not reacting to each other's events.

Principles of Psychology v1 - Chapter 5: The Automaton Theory

Citation:

James, W. (1890). *The principles of psychology*, Vol. 1. Henry Holt and Co.

- The author affirms that however numerous and delicately differentiated the train of ideas may be, the train of brain events that runs alongside it must be an exact match, and we must postulate neural machinery that offers a living counterpart for every shading, however delicate, of the history of its owner's mind.
- The author asserts that the conciseness of good news is the direct antecedent of the feeling of joy, with the belief in the conclusion; the automaton-theory must have proof between conception and belief.
- The author attests that the 'conscious automaton theory is a radical and straightforward conception of how specific facts may occur; according to the automaton-theory, specific feelings (i.e., sorrow, compunction, desire, joy, love, etc.) are the only the correlate of some nerve-movement whose cause lay wholly in a previous nerve-movement.
- The author avows that the particulars of the distribution of consciousness point to its being desirable; the brain is a tool that produces possibilities but no certainties.
- The author believes that if influenced by efficacy, the consciousness reinforces the positive possibilities and limits the negative; consciousness is practical, it must be so through its casual efficaciousness, through common sense.
- The author maintains that metaphysics is the effort to think clearly; mind-stuff is the theory that our mental states are aggregates, expressed in their most comprehensive form.
- The author affirms that if evolution is to work smoothly, consciousness in some shape must have been present at the very ongoing of things.
- *Question:* Does this mean that consciousness is a vessel confined to the limitations of the environment?
- *Answer:* This can be answered by psychological evolutionism.
- The author asserts that it is a well-known fact that pleasures are generally associated with benefits, pains with bad experiences; all the fundamental vital processes illustrate this law.
- The author attests that if pleasures and pains have no effectiveness, one does not see (without some such theoretical rational consistency as would be scouted by the

automaton-theory) why the most harmful acts, such as a broken bone, might not give thrills of delight, and the most necessary ones, such as breathing, cause agony.

- The author avows that the contention that another man's will, a feeling in his consciousness that I cannot observe, is part of the train of physical facts I may perceive is nonsense; it is an aggregate of words whose corresponding ideas will not go together.
- The author believes that the brain is a vessel of feelings and emotions somehow mixing, and in which in multiple events occur, we can witness the statistical results.

Principles of Psychology v1 - Chapter 6: The Mind-Stuff Theory

Citation:

James, W. (1890). *The principles of psychology*, Vol. 1. Henry Holt and Co.

- The author affirms that mind-stuff, produced by an infinite number of degrees of consciousness, is a complication and aggregation of multiple degrees; the theory assumes that mental states are compound.
- The author asserts that in evolution, the inorganic, theoretically, comes first, then the lowest forms of animal and vegetable life, then forms of life that possess mentality, and finally those like ourselves that possess it to a high degree.
- The author attests that a multitude of qualitatively constructed kinds of consciousness is one simplistic consciousness that is combined and recombined with itself in a multitudinous way.
- The author avows that faint pulses of subjective change can lead to a strong pulse of subjective change distinguished as a nervous shock; we cannot mix feelings like a canvas of oil colors; however, we may mix the objects we feel, and from the physical mixture get a new feeling like the blending of two genres of music (i.e., Aerosmith - rock, and DMC - hip hop).
- The author believes that all the 'combinations' which we actually know are effects wrought by the units said to be 'combined' upon some entity other than themselves; a multitude of mental elements are unable to sum themselves together.
- The author maintains that states of mind are supposed to be compound because they know multiple things together; since such states exist, they must exist as single new facts, effects, possibly, on the Soul (Self), independent and integral, and not compounded of psychic atoms.
- The author claims that a pre-disposition of consciousness allows for a *shortcut* of an act or feeling due to stimuli; a mental fact is unable to be two things at once, like the feeling of hatred, which is expressed and observed facts in multiple ways.

Do Unconscious Mental States Exist?

Proofs		James' Replies - this is directly quoted from Chapter 6, sub-chapter - Do Unconscious Mental States Exist?
1	The merest visible, the merest audible are objects comprised of parts.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We can say that each measure (minimal audio/visual) affects it somehow, which helps the advent of that movement. • A specific cause aggregate may be necessary to produce any effects when the latter is in a mental state.

2	In all acquired abilities and habits, secondarily automatic performances as they are called, we do what initially required a chain of intentionally conscious perceptions and volitions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The perceptions and preferences in accustomed actions may be performed consciously, only so quickly and inattentively that no memory of them remains, and the consciousness of these activities exists but is separate from the rest of the hemisphere's consciousness.
3	Thinking of X, we presently find ourselves thinking of Z.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Either Y was consciously there, but the next instant forgot, or its brain-tract alone was sufficient to do the whole work of coupling X with Z, without the idea of Y being stimulated at all, whether consciously or 'unconsciously.'
4	Unsolved problems when we rest at night are found solved in the morning when we wake.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consciousness is forgotten, as in the hypnotic trance.
5	In an attack of epileptiform unconsciousness, some patients will often go through complicated processes, such as eating dinner in a restaurant and paying for it or making a violent homicidal attack.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tell the subject of a hypnotic trance that he/she will remember during the trance, and he/she may remember everything perfectly when he /she awakes, though no memory would have remained without your telling him.
6	In a musical compact, the fluctuations of the several notes are in comparatively simple ratios.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The brain process produced by the simple ratios may be as directly agreeable as the conscious process of comparing them.
7	Every hour we make theoretical judgments, emotional reactions, and exhibit functional tendencies, for which we can give no specific coherent justification but which are rational deductions from certain axioms.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are all kinds of bypasses in the brain; and methods not stimulated strongly enough to give any 'idea' distinguished enough to be a premise, may, nevertheless, help to determine just that resultant method of whose psychic attribute the said idea would be a premise if the idea existed at all. It leads me to the name of the idea, but it produces no such cerebral process as the idea of the meaning would epistolize, similar to our knowledge. Each subject we learn modifies the brain, making it impossible for the latter to react as before; the difference may be a tendency to act, much as we should if we were consciously thinking about the subject.
8	As pursuits of ends by appropriate means, instincts are manifestations of intelligence; but as the ends are not foreseen, the intelligence must be unconscious.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All the phenomena of intuition are understandable as actions of the nervous system, automatically discharged by stimuli to the senses.
9	In sense-perception, we have results in excess, which can only be explained as inferences drawn by the method of unconscious reasoning from data given to sense.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Color and light contrasts are purely sensational circumstances in which deducing plays no part; our accelerated perceptions of size, shape, distance, and the like are processes of simple cerebral association. It is proven either that conscious concepts were present which the next instant was forgotten, or they prove that specific results, similar to results of reasoning, may be wrought out by rapid brain processes to which no ideation seems attached.
10	There is an excellent class of experiences in our rational life that may be described as processes that a subjective condition we have been having is distinct from what we had supposed.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We find ourselves wearied by something we thought we were enjoying well enough or affectionate with someone we imagined we only liked.

- The author affirms that two states of mind which refer to the same external reality are described as the same state of mind, or 'idea,' communicated in two editions; and then whatever traits of the second edition are found openly lacking in the first are explained as having been there, only in an 'unconscious' way.

- The author supports that consciousness is essential, similar to the brain's activity whenever the stimuli are at the moment.
- The theory of polyzoism or multiple monadism is when every brain cell has its consciousness, which no other cell knows anything about; all individual consciousness is 'ejective' to each other; there is one central among the cells or pontifical one to which our consciousness is attached.
- The author asserts that hypothesizing a soul-influenced in some mysterious way by the brain-states and responding to them by the conscious fondness of its own seems to be the line of least logical resistance.
- The author attests that we must ask ourselves whether, after all, the ascertainment of a blank unmediated correspondence, term for term, of the succession of states of consciousness with the succession of total brain-processes, be not the most straightforward psycho-physic formula, and the last word of psychology which contents itself with verifiable laws, and seeks only to be clear, and to avoid unsafe hypotheses.